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Epidemiological findings of major chemical
attacks in the Syrian war are consistent
with civilian targeting: a short report
Jose M. Rodriguez-Llanes1, Debarati Guha-Sapir2 , Benjamin-Samuel Schlüter2 and Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks3*
Abstract
Evidence of use of toxic gas chemical weapons in the Syrian war has been reported by governmental and
non-governmental international organizations since the war started in March 2011. To date, the profiles of
victims of the largest chemical attacks in Syria remain unknown. In this study, we used descriptive epidemiological
analysis to describe demographic characteristics of victims of the largest chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian war.
We analysed conflict-related, direct deaths from chemical weapons recorded in non-government-controlled areas by
the Violation Documentation Center, occurring from March 18, 2011 to April 10, 2017, with complete information on
the victim’s date and place of death, cause and demographic group. ‘Major’ chemical weapons events were defined as
events causing ten or more direct deaths.
As of April 10, 2017, a total of 1206 direct deaths meeting inclusion criteria were recorded in the dataset from all
chemical weapons attacks regardless of size. Five major chemical weapons attacks caused 1084 of these documented
deaths. Civilians comprised the majority (n = 1058, 97.6%) of direct deaths from major chemical weapons attacks in
Syria and combatants comprised a minority of 2.4% (n = 26). In the first three major chemical weapons attacks, which
occurred in 2013, children comprised 13%–14% of direct deaths, ranging in numbers from 2 deaths among 14 to 117
deaths among 923. Children comprised higher proportions of direct deaths in later major chemical weapons attacks,
forming 21% (n = 7) of 33 deaths in the 2016 major attack and 34.8% (n = 32) of 92 deaths in the 2017 major attack.
Our finding of an extreme disparity in direct deaths from major chemical weapons attacks in Syria, with 97.6% of
victims being civilians and only 2.4% being combatants provides evidence that major chemical weapons attacks were
indiscriminate or targeted civilians directly; both violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Identifying and
quantifying chemical weapons violations requires inter-disciplinary collaboration to inform international policy,
humanitarian intervention and legal action.
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Background
The use in war of chemical weapons was condemned by
the general opinion of the civilized world and prohibited
with the signing of the 1925 Geneva Protocol [1]. Further
prohibition includes the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC),
which became binding international law in 1997 [2]. In
violation of these prohibitions, some parties to war have
used chemical weapons in conflicts [3], including in Syria.
Evidence of use of chemical weapons in Syria in the form
of numerous toxic gas attacks has been reported by
governmental and non-governmental international organi-
zations since the Syrian war started in March 2011. Joint
investigations by the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) with the United Nations
(UN) between April and November 2013 confirmed the
use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus
on 21 August 2013 and on a smaller scale, in Jobar on 24
August 2013, Saraqueb on 29 April 2013, Ashrafiah
Sahnaya on 25 August 2013 and Khan Al Asal on 19
March 2013 [4]. Later reports provided evidence with a
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high degree of certainty that chlorine gas was used as a
weapon in the villages of Talmenes, Al Tamanah, and Kafr
Zita from April to August 2014 [5]. On 21 August 2015,
the OPCW fact-finding mission (FFM) reported on the
investigation of several incidents in the Idlib governorate
between 16 March 2015 and 20 May 2015 and concluded
that these gas attacks likely involved the use of sulphur
mustard and in occasions combined with chlorine [6].
The Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) carried out
parallel investigations involving the collection by medical
staff of biological samples taken from the many patients
treated after gas attacks and environmental samples
collected from the area of attacks. SAMS identified the
use of three toxic gases – Sarin, chlorine and mustard
agents – and confirmed the findings of OPCW-UN inves-
tigations [7]. In April 4, 2017 missiles launched from air
allegedly loaded with toxic chemical gases attacked the
town of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib, Syria. The Violations
Documentation Center (VDC) reported at least 92 identi-
fiable deaths by the time of this study [8] and others, even
more [9]. The medical humanitarian NGO, Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF) concluded that at least two toxic gases,
Sarin and chlorine, may have been used in these attacks,
based on evidence from MSF medical teams supporting
the emergency department of Bab Al Hawa hospital and
other hospitals [10]. A joint FFM by the OPCW-UN
reported the presence of Sarin or a Sarin-like substance in
laboratory samples taken by the FFM team during the
autopsies of three victims by this attack [11]. To the date
of this study, the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) of
the OPCW/UN, based on the FFM reports, concluded
that the Syrian Air Force was the perpetrator of at least
three attacks with chlorine (Kafr Zita - 18 April 2014,
Qmenas - 16 March 2015 and Binnish, 24 March 2015). It
also concluded that the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIS/ISIL) perpetrated at least one attack with
mustard agent (Mare’e, 21 August 2015) [12]. Investiga-
tions and evidence of the use of chemical weapons in Syria
reported by governmental and non-governmental
international organizations are essential components of
civilian protection.
The research community has so far contributed
relatively little to civilian protection or to understand-
ing the public health consequences of chemical
weapons attacks in Syria [13–16]. In earlier studies
we described patterns of direct deaths and victim
characteristics caused by the range of weapons used
in the Syrian war from the beginning of the war in
March of 2011 through December 2016 [15, 16]. Here
we use descriptive epidemiological analysis to address
in detail the fundamental question of who have been
the victims of the largest chemical weapons attacks in
the Syrian war from March 18, 2011 to April 10,
2017.
Methods
Data were obtained with permission from the VDC [8], a
non-profit, non-governmental independent organisation
that tracks and documents in the public domain war-re-
lated deaths from the beginning of the Syrian war. Direct
deaths documented by the VDC are arguably a verifiable
minimum; most other sources report higher numbers but
are without a comparable verification protocol [17, 18].
Only the VDC systematically reports sex, age category
(children versus adult), and victim’s status (civilian versus
combatant) of each recorded direct death from the Syrian
war, thereby making these data particularly useful for epi-
demiological analysis of the impact of weapons on the Syr-
ian civilian population [15–18].
The VDC applies international standards for documenta-
tion of human rights violations by a ground network
consisting of a minimum 30 internationally-trained field
reporters [15, 16]. Field reporters collect data in three
steps. First, initial information on one or more victims is
gathered, mainly from hospitals, morgues, relatives of the
victims, and media sources. Second, the initial report is fur-
ther confirmed, where possible, by supporting information
on victims such as videos or photographs. Third, key infor-
mation missing on victims is actively investigated until
completion of record. VDC registries are verified daily,
updated with new information and records for each death:
demographics, date, location, cause of death and civilian
versus combatant status. The VDC identifies combatant
deaths by an iterative process including multiple sources of
information and validation. All those identified as combat-
ants by VDC in our analyses had information on military
rank or armed group (n = 26). Given that ascertaining
information on victims in government-controlled areas is
often challenging, as stated by others conducting studies
on the Syrian war [16, 19], we analysed data from non-
government-controlled areas. Our inclusion criteria were:
conflict-related, direct deaths from chemical weapons
attacks, occurring from March 18, 2011 to April 10, 2017,
with complete information on the victim’s date and place
of death, cause and demographic group (adult male, adult
female, child). Chemical weapons were defined as toxic
substances delivered in any form. This study focused on
‘major’ chemical weapons events, defined as those causing
ten or more direct deaths thereby meeting the inclusion
criteria set out by the authors of this study. For the
purposes of this study, we defined children as individuals
younger than 18 years of age, consistent with the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child [20]. Further details on the
VDC dataset and data collection are described elsewhere
[8, 15, 16].
Deaths from major chemical weapons attacks
A total of 1206 direct deaths meeting inclusion criteria
were identified in the dataset from all chemical weapons
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attacks regardless of size during the study period. Five
major chemical weapons attacks were identified that
caused direct deaths of ten or more individuals. The five
major chemical weapons attacks resulted in a total of
1084 documented direct deaths recorded as of 10 April
2017 and meeting study criteria. As is apparent from
Table 1, VDC data indicate that nearly all of those who
died from the five largest chemical attacks in Syria were
civilians. Civilians composed 97.6% (n = 1058) of direct
deaths from major chemical weapon attacks and
combatants only 2.4% (n = 26). This extreme disparity in
effect on victims suggests that chemical weapons attacks
in Syria were indiscriminate or targeted against civilians,
both being violations of International Humanitarian Law
(IHL). The extreme disparity is also consistent with
arguments that chemical weapon attacks were not as
much a war tactic against opponents as a terror and
displacement strategy against Syrian civilians.
Among the 1058 civilian direct deaths from major
chemical attacks, civilian men carried the largest burden
of death comprising over half of direct civilian deaths in
the five major chemical attacks (n = 579, 54.7%), women
30.0% (n = 318) and children 15.2% (n = 161). Of the
earliest four major chemical attacks, in 2013, two
occurred in Aleppo (19 March 2013 and 13 April 2013)
and one in Ghouta, Damascus suburbs (21 August
2013). In the 21 August 2013 attack in Damascus
suburbs, which caused the largest number of 897 civilian
deaths among the five major attacks, 30 % of the victims
killed were women (Table 1). In the case of the Ghouta
attack, independent investigations by OPCW/UN found
positive for Sarin and Sarin signatures biological samples
from various victims. The other two former attacks were
field-investigated but were inconclusive on chemical
used [4]. After 3 years, on 12 December 2016, Jrouh
village in Hama was bombed by two shells filled with
Sarin gas which is a lethal toxic gas. Over a fifth of the
immediate deaths from this attack were of children
(n = 7). As can be seen in Table 1, children comprised
higher proportions of direct civilian deaths in the last two
of the five major chemical attacks during the study period.
In particular, the most recent major chemical attack, on 4
April 2017 in Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib, where Sarin or
Sarin-like substances were used [11], caused the highest
proportion of deaths of children, who composed one-third
of direct deaths from this attack (n = 32, 34.8%). As was
the case in four of the five major chemical weapons at-
tacks during the study period, no combatants were docu-
mented dead from the attack (Table 1), a finding that
supports arguments that IHL was violated with respect to
the protection of civilians.
Consequences of chemical attacks
Sarin and other nerve agents are organophosphorus
compounds that attack the nervous system by interfering
with degradation of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine
at neuromuscular junctions. Death occurs from asphyxia
due to loss of control and paralysis of muscles involved
in breathing [3, 21]. Exposure to Sarin can be fatal
through dermal contact, by breathing air containing
Sarin or by consuming contaminated food or water [3,
21–23]. However this intoxication risk is short-lasted as
Sarin does not persist more than a 4–8 days in the envir-
onment [22]. Chlorine gas is the elemental form of
Chlorine and is a severe pulmonary, dermal as well as
digestive irritant. Inhalation causes life-threatening re-
spiratory distress and fluid accumulation in the lungs
potentially leading to death by suffocation [7]. Sulfur
mustard, commonly known as mustard gas, is a class of
cytotoxic compounds. Sulfur mustard compounds can
be severe dermal, conjunctival and pulmonary irritants,
can cause severe burns and are carcinogenic as well as
blistering agents [3, 6, 7].
All of these toxic gases are heavier than air, causing
the chemical agents to sink to low-lying areas to create a
greater exposure hazard [7, 23]. Because of this, civilians
who shelter in basements, which typically offer greater
protection from explosive attacks such as barrel bombs,
are at a heightened risk of death from chemical attacks,
such as from barrel bombs containing chlorine used in
Table 1 Direct deaths of civilians and combatants attributed to major chemical weapons attacks in the Syrian war (March 18th, 2011









Civilian deaths per attack
n (%)
Deaths per attack, % of total deathsa
n (%)
Khan Al Asal, Aleppo 19–03-13 12 (54.5) 7 (31.8) 3 (13.6) 22 (100.0) 22 (1.8)
Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo 13–04-13 9 (64.3) 3 (21.4) 2 (14.3) 14 (100.0) 14 (1.2)
Ghouta, Damascus Suburbs 21–08-13 524b (56.8) 282 (30.5) 117 (12.7) 897 (97.2) 923b (76.5)
Jrouh, Hama 12–12-16 21 (63.6) 5 (15.2) 7 (21.2) 33 (100.0) 33 (2.7)
Khan Sheikhoun, Idlib 04–04-17 39 (42.4) 21 (22.8) 32 (34.8) 92c (100.0) 92 (7.6)
Total 605b (55.8) 318 (29.3) 161 (14.9) 1058 (97.6) 1084b (89.9)
aAll chemical weapons attacks caused a total of 1206 documented direct deaths. ‘Major’ chemical weapons attacks were defined as those causing ten or more
direct deaths. bOf which 26 deaths were of adult male combatants from the Free Syrian Army (FSA). cDocumented as of 10 April 2017. Source: VDC
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Syria [7]. Being closer to the ground, children are more
exposed to chemical agents. In addition, small children
are at especially high risk from chemical agents as they
have a higher body-surface-area-to-mass ratio; skin that
is more permeable, and high metabolic and respiratory
rates [24–26]. The first reaction to bombing is to take
shelter, but people are often unaware that they must also
close doors, windows and air vents to prevent gas
entering [7]. Populations subject to chemical attacks are
usually uninformed on precautionary behaviors to
reduce exposure and health consequences, pointing to
the importance of public awareness campaigns such as
those initiated in some areas of Syria [7]. Barriers that
need to be overcome for effective public awareness
campaigns in conflict areas can include disrupted infra-
structure, population displacement, lack of educational
resources, and limited communication and movement in
an insecure environment.
Recommendations: a call to advocacy and action
The UN Security Council (UNSC) and the world have
condemned chemical attacks in Syria to little effect. In
2013, under President Bashar al-Assad, Syria became a
State Party to the Treaty on the Chemical Weapons
Convention as part of an agreement to acknowledge and
relinquish its stocks of Sarin, Venomous Agent X, and
mustard gas. Subsequently, use of nerve agents de-
creased, but was replaced by increased use of chlorine
gas [7]. The UNSC Resolution 2209 condemned the use
of chlorine gas as a weapon in Syria in 2015, yet chlorine
attacks continued to be documented [7]. Regarding the
destruction of the chemical weapons production facil-
ities under the 2013 agreement, one hangar remains
undestroyed and the condition of two other stationary
aboveground facilities is unknown due to the security
situation. In May 2016 the UNSC passed Resolution
2286 condemning attacks on medical facilities and
personnel. In November 2016 Syrian pro-government
forces carried out a chemical attack against medical
personnel [27].
It is essential that impartial and credible investigations
of these chemical weapon attacks continue by the
OPCW-UN and NGOs and that a structure of IHL
standards and prohibitions exists. However, as suggested
by this course of events, if violations of IHL against
using chemical weapons are allowed to continue with
impunity, then offenders have no incentive to end the
use of chemical weapons until their goals are achieved,
as can be argued is occurring in Syria. For actors in
conflict who find chemical attacks acceptable, moral
condemnation by international bodies is ineffectual
unless backed up by active prevention or consequences.
Prevention by decreasing access to resources and com-
ponents that are necessary to produce chemical weapons
could potentially decrease the use of chemical weapons,
but this can be difficult. For example, chlorine gas is
relatively cheap to produce, is an agent commonly used
in the chemical industry and is thus difficult to control
[28]. We suggest urgent attention to the strict control of
commercial sales of chlorine, for example by a regula-
tory authority, given that its use has become normative
in the Syrian war as a weapon [7].
Increasing preparation, education and resources to
deal with chemical attacks can decrease mortality and
decrease the severity of injuries. Training of first re-
sponse and medical personnel for appropriate responses
to chemical attacks is an important measure to reduce
casualties [3, 7, 29]. Despite great effort by medical and
support personnel in Syria, training in Syria has been
limited by the insecure environment, lack of supplies
and severe overwork of the medical personnel caring for
casualties of war [7, 29, 30]. Decontamination and pro-
tective equipment to minimize continued exposure to
chemical agents is essential during rescue and treatment
of chemical attack victims in order to reduce injuries
and deaths [3, 7, 29]. Sarin is highly toxic even in very
small amounts, and when absorbed through skin or re-
spiratory channels can cause death within a few minutes
to 2 h [3, 23]. Mustard agents produce the first symp-
toms in 2–24 h after exposure, have no antidote, cause
long-term injuries and have a lower lethal capacity than
Sarin-like substances [3, 6]. Due to lack of adequate
protective equipment, especially in besieged areas, first
responders and medical staff in Syria have sickened and
died from chemical contamination while treating victims
of attacks, and cross-contamination of patients occurs
[7]. Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) kits for first
responders and medical staff are an acute need [7, 29].
Severe shortages of antidotes such as atropine, ventila-
tion equipment, protective equipment and means to
clean or store contaminated clothing have increased
chemical attack casualties in the Syrian war and
continue to be critical unmet needs [7, 29, 30]. We urge
increasing supplies of these basic, critical resources to
medical personnel working in Syria in order to improve
survival and in order to decrease the immediate and
long-term impacts of chemical weapon attacks.
Long-term health effects of chemical exposure are not
only generally unknown to local populations but can
also last for years [3, 31]. The physical, neurological and
mental health effects from chemical weapons exposure
are both acute and long-term, requiring adequate
resources for immediate treatment and for long-term ef-
fects. Some of the attacked areas are farming hamlets
and are especially vulnerable to the potential contamin-
ation of food and the food chain by persistent agents
such as mustard and nerve agents [28, 32]. Even if
people are aware of the risks, frequently there are no
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alternative sources to meet their basic needs. Hence,
attacks on rural regions with Sarin may have additional ef-
fects [31]. Having these facts in mind, risk communication,
public awareness programs and monitoring for long-term
effects are important public health measures to reduce the
immediate and long-term burden of chemical attacks. The
development of communications systems using social
media and cell phone technology could provide wide-
spread, rapid, public safety instructions, education and
alerts for chemical weapons attacks [33, 34].
Epidemiological research on the public health impact of
chemical weapons can increase awareness and informa-
tion on the scope of effects on the population and can
identify particularly vulnerable groups [13]. Such informa-
tion can inform policy and interventions. Increased inter-
disciplinary communication and collaboration between
researchers, personnel in the field and NGOs gathering
data and experience may be especially important in
addressing the impact of armed conflict on populations.
Conclusions
We found that civilians comprised the vast majority of dir-
ect deaths from major chemical weapon attacks compared
to combatants, to a degree that suggests that chemical
weapon attacks in Syria were indiscriminate or targeted
against civilians in violation of IHL. Children comprised
higher proportions of direct deaths in the two most recent
major chemical attacks of the study period, including in
Khan Sheikhoun where they comprised one-third of all im-
mediate deaths. The UNSC and other international bodies
should not only investigate perpetrators of chemical attacks
but also hold them accountable for their actions. Simultan-
eously, the international community needs to respond
quickly with greater practical support to Syrian medical
and emergency facilities so that they can meet the acute
medical needs of a population targeted by chemical
attacks.
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